Safeguard Against Faction and Separation of Powers
Federalist Nos. 9, 10, and 51
On Factions, Federalist No. 10
Actually, I’d like to start with Federalist No. 9. Each of these “papers” is relatively short. Alexander Hamilton’s “The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection” introduces key terms that apply in Federalist No. 10, so I’m starting with the shorter No. 9, followed by my summary of Federalist 10. Then we’ll discuss Federalist No. 51. What Hamilton means by “faction” doesn’t come until No. 10, so we’ll let your pr-reflective understanding of faction stand until Madison defines it in Federalist No. 10.
Safeguard Against Faction and Insurrection, Federalist No. 9
Federalist 9 was written by Hamilton and published on November 21, 1787. Recall that these papers were published predominantly in newspapers in New York and circulated throughout the Confederacy (not that one), soon to be Union. The Constitution replaced the weaker and inadequate Articles of Confederation that sustained the Confederacy during the Revolutionary War but did not license the adequate authority to govern over the newly formed Republic; namely, the Articles of Confederation did not enable taxation. If that material doesn’t sound familiar, go back and read the earlier posts.
The Federalists studied historical (small “r”) republican forms of government to inform the design of their union. They understood that several historical republics stood on shaky ground. Often, single leaders consolidated power only to be usurped by revolution. Hamilton observes that many past republics oscillated between tyranny and anarchy.
Informed by Enlightenment principles of balance and reason, Hamilton appeals to science to establish principles for establishing a more steady system of government: political science. Hamilton sets these principles for a stable republic:
Governmental power is partitioned into distinct departments
Legislature with balances and checks
Institutions of courts, where judges hold office on the condition of good behavior
The people elect legislators in the government to represent them
Hamilton introduces these principles to safeguard the republic's internal tranquility against faction and insurrection. He appeals again to Montesquieu, the French political theorist we briefly mentioned in our last post. Montesquieu was a champion of moderation, another key Enlightenment philosophical principle.
Montesquieu wrote of a “Confederate Republic”—a form of government that is both a confederacy and that is governed by a central government, as a balance between monarchy and republicanism. Balance, restraint, partition, moderation, and agency are core values that we’ve picked up on so far in our introductory readings and what we’re discussing today. Do you understand modern American democracy to continue to uphold these principles?
This summary of Hamilton’s Federalist 9 sets us up nicely for James Madison’s Federalist No. 10, which would be published the very next day, on November 22, 1787.
The Same Subject Continued, Federalist No. 10
James Madison picks up where Hamilton left off with the aptly named “The Same Subject Continued.” The benefit of a union, writes Madison, is to break the violence of faction. Madison observes that the public good is often sacrificed in the fighting between rival parties—sound familiar?—and decisions are too often made not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party “but by the superior force of an interested and overwhelming majority.”
In other words: “Might makes right” is the wrong principle by which to govern. It is from this observation that Madison says what he means by faction:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
A faction's defining characteristic is its violation of the rights of other citizens or a violation of the aggregate interests of the community. The union has a role to play in suppressing such factions, ostensibly to protect individual rights and uphold the common interests of the community.
Madison explains that there are two ways to suppress such a faction, either by removing its causes or controlling the effects, neither of which is an acceptable solution. To remove the cause of faction is to remove liberty. I am especially impressed with the Federalist’s understanding that with liberty arises the strength in some to oppress a minor party, and so, with the promotion of liberty arises its own conditions that may undermine it. A precarious balance.
Controlling the effects of faction is also unacceptable because if the effects of faction are violent disagreement over common interests, then control would be to suppress such disagreement or descent. Suppressing factions by eliminating liberty or imposing the same beliefs is unacceptable.
Here, Madison observes that these disagreements arise from human nature itself. Again, we’re reading the Federalists in their Enlightenment setting, and human nature, including natural rights, is a dominant philosophical ideology. Like Hobbes, Rousseau, and Locke, human rights and the human “state of nature” are vehicles for pre-political reflection on our natural states. This explains why Madison says in Federalist 51 that government is nothing but the ultimate response to human nature. For more on Hobbes’ view and my application to current events, you can see this post from January 11, 2025.
Keeping with another Enlightenment concern with personal property is also central to Federalist No. 10. Beyond human nature that draws us into conflict, Madison observes that nothing drives conflict more than the unequal distribution of property. While I’d love to read this through my personal political leangings toward Democratic Socialism, for the Federalists, they were representing the elite class, and so, we must read them on property as concerned with a wealthier class. The Federalists believed a strong federal government was needed to secure property rights along with individual liberties. Secure property was a requisite for economic prosperity.
Madison sets out the principle tasks of modern legislation: regulating different interests that involve the spirit of party and faction in the regular operations of government. Because it is people’s natural state to be drawn toward conflict, Madison sees the role of government as not suppressing liberty or imposing control but as regulating these tendencies within government. See how this builds on balance and moderation.
Again, with an eye into our modern political environment, Madison cautions that an enlightened statesman will not always be at the helm of government. This observation is put in service of instructing majority parties to not tax smaller parties to line their own pockets. This conversation also involves a discussion of pure democracy, whereby each person will vote on legislation, and the representative democracy whereby citizens vote for their political leaders. The issues facing pure democracy are that it would require communities too small to know all issues on which to vote but unable to reign in factions. Madison figured that factions could be defeated by majority vote. We may think that Madison fails to consider that a faction ideology may become the majority. He thinks that a spark of faction may arise in a state, but (optimistically) he is skeptical that from the spark would arise a conflagation engulfing other states as well.
The republic is an antidote to such diseases, Madison concludes.
Structure of Government and Checks and Balances, Federalist No. 51
Madison addresses the question in Federalist 51, how do you maintain a partition of power among several departments. He finds the answer to be structural in nature: The very structure of government must be that these partitions hold. He puts it like this:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others.
Madison called for security against consolidation of power: as for the means to resist encroachment between departments, the provision defense must be commensurate to the danger of attack.
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
Key Federalist Ideas and Modern Relevance
We’ve spent a lot of time with these papers: 9, 10, and 51. I think it’s important that we understand what Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were worried about, and how they intended tomitigate those concerns through structuring the Contitution, indeed, structuring government itself. Following the key points that I attempted to highlight in thispost.
Concise Key Points:
Factions Threaten Public Good:
Madison's "faction" (groups prioritizing self-interest) remains a core issue in today's polarized politics.
Large Republics Dilute Faction Power:
The Federalist idea of a large republic is still relevant in discussions of federal vs. state power and diverse representation.
Checks and Balances Are Essential:
The need for checks and balances is constantly tested by debates on executive power, judicial independence, and legislative gridlock.
Human Nature Impacts Governance:
The Federalists' recognition of human flaws highlights the ongoing need for safeguards against abuse of power.
Property Rights Remain Contentious:
The protection of property rights is still debated in modern political discourse.
Modern Relevance:
Increased polarization and social media amplify factionalism.
Democratic institutions face challenges from partisan gridlock and debates over power.
Economic inequality fuels social unrest.
The role of the federal government is constantly debated.
The definition of individual rights is constantly evolving.
Madison published Federalist No. 51 on February 6, 1788. It’s been 237 years since, and this essay appears to speak directly into 2025 politics. Maybe it is our nature, after all, that is drawn to conflict. A central federal government with clear partitions between them was the answer then, as I’d argue, it is still.